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DLD-192

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-4487
___________
JAMES SPENCER,
Appellant
v.

WARDEN ALLENWOOD USP; PA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-01120)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 6, 2014
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 27, 2014)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
James Spencer, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

In 1996, Spencer was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania of ten counts of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a), and firearms offenses. He was sentenced to life in prison for the Hobbs Act
violations and concurrent and consecutive sentences for his other crimes. We affirmed
the judgment on direct appeal. See C.A. No. 96-1916.
Spencer filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In 2000,
the District Court denied the motion on the merits. We denied Spencer’s request for a
certificate of appealability. See C.A. No. 00-1313. In 2007, the District Court denied
Spencer’s motion for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We again
denied Spencer’s request for a certificate of appealability. See C.A. No. 07-3366.
In 2013, Spencer filed a habeas petition pursuant to § 2241 in the Middle District
of Pennsylvania challenging his conviction. Spencer claimed, among other things, that
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, that his trial counsel was ineffective, and that his
indictment contained false information and is void. Spencer also moved to transfer his
petition to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because his records and witnesses are
located there. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation to dismiss the habeas petition and deny the motion to transfer because
Spencer may not challenge his conviction by way of a petition brought pursuant to
§ 2241. This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). Our review of
the District Court’s legal conclusions is plenary. Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner,
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290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
“Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which
federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences. . . .” Okereke v. United
States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). Although a petitioner may challenge a
conviction pursuant to § 2241 where a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or
ineffective,” the mere fact that the petitioner is unable to meet the gatekeeping
requirements of § 2255 does not render a § 2255 motion inadequate or ineffective.
Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538-39. Rather, a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective “only
where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would
prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his
wrongful detention claim.” Id. at 538.
Spencer has not made such a showing. This is not the unusual case of a petitioner
who did not have an earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an
intervening change in substantive law may have negated. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997) (allowing petitioner to raise such a claim under § 2241). Spencer
may not seek relief pursuant to § 2241 because he is unable to meet the gatekeeping
requirements for filing a second or successive § 2255 motion. Thus, the District Court
did not err in dismissing Spencer’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, as this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
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